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ABSTRACT
We examine whether hot hands exist among hedge fund managers. In measuring performance persistence,
we use hedge fund style benchmarks. This allows us to identify managers with valuable skills, and
also to control for option-like features inherent in returns from hedge fund strategies. We take into
account the possibility that reported asset values may be based on stale prices. We develop a statistical
model that relates a hedge fund’s performance to its decision to liquidate or close in order to infer
the performance of a hedge fund that left the database. While we find significant performance persistence
among superior funds we find little evidence of persistence among inferior funds.
Ravi Jagannathan
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The hedge fund industry has grown at an astounding pace from 610 funds controlling $39
billion in 1990 to more than 9,000 funds with $1.9 trillion in 2007.1 While it appears
that investors have enthusiastically embraced hedge funds as an investment vehicle, and are
especially eager to invest in hedge funds that have exhibited outstanding past returns, there is
little consensus in the empirical ﬁnance literature on whether there is performance persistence
among hedge funds. In part that is due to the fact that any rigorous research about hedge
fund performance has to overcome numerous biases and irregularities in the available data.
These biases arise due to the unregulated nature of the hedge fund industry. There are
no legal requirements for hedge funds to report performance numbers, although there are
several diﬀerent databases, to which hedge funds provide information about themselves on
a voluntarily basis.2 Ackerman, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Liang (2000), Fung and
Hsieh (2000) and Fung and Hsieh (2002) discuss the issues that arise when using data from
these sources.
In this paper we study performance persistence among hedge fund managers, while cor-
recting for measurement errors as well as for the backﬁll, serial correlation, and look-ahead
biases in the data. We conjecture that certain types of skills are more valuable at certain
points in time but the match decays over time. Given the decay, we cannot use a long time
series to identify those managers whose skills will be in demand in the near future. Therefore,
we use peer3 evaluation to identify managers who are likely to have superior skills relative to
their peer group, i.e., positive relative alpha. To the extent that there are common factors
that aﬀect all managers in a peer group, relative alphas can be estimated more precisely than
alphas by controlling for these common eﬀects. This is especially true with short time series
of hedge fund return data on individual hedge fund managers. However, evidence of the rel-
ative performance persistence cannot be directly interpreted as superior fund performance
to an investor. Indeed, outperforming the group of peers does not guarantee superior alpha
in absolute terms, as the entire peer group may have inferior performance. We examine
whether managers with superior historical relative alpha indeed also have superior future
alpha in the following way. We construct managed portfolios of hedge funds based on their
historical relative alpha, and examine their out-of-sample performance using the multifactor
hedge fund performance evaluation model of Fung and Hsieh (2004).
An important feature of a hedge fund database is backﬁll bias - the case when hedge
funds bring their history with them when they join a database. Since only funds with
1“Plenty of Alternatives,” The Economist, Feb 28, 2008.
2Among them are CISDM, TASS and HFR (we use the HFR database in the paper).
3We deﬁne “peers” as a group of hedge funds pursuing similar strategies.
2relatively superior historical performance enter a database, when possible backﬁlling of data
is ignored, it results in a bias toward mistakenly assigning superior ability to managers of
funds in their earlier years. Since our HFR data contains the information on when funds
actually joined the database, we are able to eliminate the backﬁll bias by deleting all the
backﬁll observations in our data set. Moreover, our data is survivorship bias free, since the
HFR database retains all hedge funds, including those that ceased to exist.
Another issue with hedge fund analysis is that hedge fund returns exhibit substantial
serial correlation, a feature that is extensively investigated in Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov
(2004) and Okunev and White (2003). They showed that the presence of illiquid assets in
hedge fund portfolios are the primary source for the serial correlation. If serial correlation is
not accounted for properly, the manager’s performance measure will be biased. Notice that
when hedge fund returns exhibit serial correlation due to the presence of illiquid assets in the
portfolio, benchmark style index factor returns will also exhibit such serial correlation. We
assume that unobserved “true” returns on assets are serially uncorrelated, and identify them
using the MA2 approach suggested by Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004). We measure
performance relative to a carefully chosen portfolio of fund speciﬁc style index benchmarks
and a broad stock market index, i.e., we use alpha relative to peers. To the extent peers
within each hedge fund style take similar risks, we are able to control for option-like features
in returns.
We evaluate hedge fund performance persistence by comparing the alphas over consec-
utive nonoverlapping three year intervals. This is a fairly long time period relative to the
time periods examined in the literature reviewed in the following section. Considering a
three-year period allows us to accurately capture relative alphas for individual funds, and
also provides us with a better sense of investor returns accounting for lockup, notice, and
redemption periods. For example, an investor in a fund with a two year lockup period can
realistically expect to receive her money from two years and three months to two years and
six months later. Lockup periods vary among diﬀerent funds, but periods of two years or
more have gotten more common in recent years.4 Following Hsieh,5 we employ a method
of weighted least squares in order to minimize the downward bias in persistence caused by
measurement errors in alphas. We assign more weight to more precisely measured alphas in
our sample. We further apply this approach to study persistence among the best performing
and the worst performing funds separately.
4For example, in 1996, LTCM allowed to withdraw one third of investor’s capital in years 2, 3, and 4
(Perold (1999)). The adoption of a new SEC rule in December 2004 provided further incentives for hedge
funds to adopt lockup periods in excess of two years (the rule was struck down by the US Court of Appeals
in June 2006).
5Mimeo, private communication.
3Finally, some hedge funds stop reporting to the database before the end of the sample
period used in the study.6 That may lead to a biased estimate of alpha-persistence when
the likelihood of a fund leaving the database is related to its past and expected future
performance. Therefore, estimating performance persistence by regressing future alpha on
past alpha without addressing conditional nature of the observed distribution of alphas may
produce a biased estimate of alpha persistence. We follow the terminology of Baquero,
Ter Horst, and Verbeek (2005), and refer to it as a look-ahead bias. We simultaneously
address measurement errors and the look-ahead bias by building a statistical model that
assumes that hedge funds that are liquidated are more likely to be ones with low past
p e r f o r m a n c ea n dt h o s et h a ta r ec l o s e da r em o r el i k e l yt ob eo n e sw i t hh i g hp a s tp e r f o r m a n c e .
Our statistical model provides additional information about the unobserved performance of
funds thereby reducing the measurement error in estimated alphas, provided the model
is right. We assume that hedge funds that stop reporting but do not give a reason are
drawn from the same distribution as funds that continue to report or stop reporting but
tell us why. With these assumptions, which we empirically show are reasonable, we develop
a GMM estimation method that estimates all parameters in the model and produces an
estimate of performance persistence. Our approach is also consistent with the observation
in Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001) and Liang (2000) that hedge funds with low past
performance are primary candidates for liquidation. Overall, both weighted least squares
and GMM approaches produce similar estimates of performance persistence.
The unobserved performance of a hedge fund after it stopped reporting to the database
can result in a biased persistence estimate. For example, a fund that has a large positive
alpha during the ﬁrst three year period may perform poorly during the second three year
period and liquidate; a fund that has a large negative alpha during the ﬁrst three year period
may perform extremely well during the second three year period and close; and both funds
will stop reporting their performance data. That could cause a positive bias in measured
persistence in the alphas of funds that survived during both three year periods. While it is
a possibility, we provide diagnostics indicating that it is not a likely scenario.
We ﬁnd relative performance persistence over a three year horizon, i.e. that managers
with higher estimated alphas in one three year period tend to have higher estimated relative
alphas in the following three year period. The average performance persistence parameter
estimate is 28% from the weighted least squares approach,7 and 31% from the GMM proce-
6Notice that the fact of nonreporting to a database does not mean fund liquidation. For example, a fund
may stop reporting after it has been closed for new investors. Such a hedge fund will continue to manage
funds of current investors.
7Individual cross-section estimates for the weighted least squares approach vary from 4.4% to 52.7%.
4dure.8 In comparison, a simple regression of future alphas on past alphas gives a downward
biased average estimate of only 22% for alpha persistence.
Notice that an investor can only beneﬁt from our approach by investing in hedge funds
run by talented managers, and staying away from the ones that have not demonstrated
persistent skill, since an investor cannot take a short position in a hedge fund. Hence we
concentrate on investigating positive performance persistence, which could be interpreted
as evidence of valuable managerial skill. We conduct out-of-sample portfolio tests based on
historical alpha and relative alpha rankings, and ﬁnd evidence of performance persistence
among the top hedge funds. In contrast, there is no evidence of persistence among the
bottom funds. Consistent with our conjecture of relative performance being a better measure
of valuable managerial talent, we conclude that historical superior relative performance is
a better predictor of superior future absolute performance, compared to historical superior
absolute performance. We document that a portfolio of the top 33% of funds ranked by their
historical relative alpha t-statistic retained 26% of its historical alpha in the out-of-sample
period, while a similar portfolio formed by alpha t-statistic ranking only retained 19% of its
historical alpha.9
Our ﬁndings are consistent with Berk and Green (2004) who show, using a rational model
of active portfolio management, that in equilibrium more money will ﬂow to managers with
superior skills. This leads to an erosion of performance over time and equalization of after
fee returns available to investors from managers with diﬀerent levels of skills, when there are
diminishing returns to scale. Nevertheless, only part of the superior performance erodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a connec-
tion to the existing hedge fund performance persistence literature. Section 3 describes the
methodology for empirical testing. The model of hedge fund performance is introduced,
factor selection, return smoothing and look-ahead bias issues are discussed there. Tests
for performance persistence are also explained. Section 4 contains data description, along
with estimation of hedge fund performance persistence. Out-of-sample tests of performance
persistence are performed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There are several papers in the literature that examine hedge fund managers’ performance
persistence. Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) estimated the oﬀshore hedge fund
8Individual cross-section estimates from the GMM procedure vary from 5.8% to 49.6%.
9A portfolio of the top 10% of funds ranked by their past relative alpha t-statistic retained 45% of its past
alpha in the out-of-sample period, while a similar portfolio formed by alpha t-statistic ranking retained 28%
of its past alpha.
5performance using raw returns, risk adjusted returns using the CAPM, and excess returns
over self reported style benchmarks. They found little persistence in relative performance
across managers. On the contrary, Agarwal and Naik (2000a) and Agarwal and Naik (2000b)
when using both oﬀshore and onshore hedge funds found signiﬁcant quarterly persistence -
that is hedge funds with relatively high returns in the current quarter tend to earn relatively
high returns in the next quarter. They used the return on a hedge fund in excess of the
average return earned by all funds that follow the same strategy as a measure of perfor-
mance.10 They used both parametric and nonparametric tests for performance persistence.
In their case the persistence was driven mostly by “losers”. Edwards and Caglayan (2001)
considered an eight-factor model to evaluate hedge fund performance. They found the ev-
idence of performance persistence over one and two year horizons. They also showed that
the persistence holds among both “winners” and “losers”.
More recently, Bares, Gibson, and Gyger (2003) applied a non-parametric approach to
individual funds, as well as an eight-factor APT model to fund portfolios with a conclusion of
performance persistence only over one to three month horizons. Capocci and Hübner (2004)
followed the methodology of Carhart (1997), discovering no evidence of performance per-
sistence for best and worst performing funds, but providing limited evidence of persistence
for middle decile funds. Boyson and Cooper (2004) have found no evidence of performance
p e r s i s t e n c ei fo n l yc o m m o nr i s ka n ds t y l ef a c t o rs are used in estimation, but discovered quar-
terly persistence when manager tenure was taken into consideration. Baquero, Ter Horst,
and Verbeek (2005) concentrated on accounting for the look-ahead bias in evaluating hedge
fund performance. Comparing raw and style-adjusted performance of performance-ranked
portfolios they found evidence of positive persistence at the quarterly level. Kosowski, Naik,
and Teo (2007) used a seven-factor model and applied a bootstrap procedure, as well as
Bayesian measures to estimate hedge fund performance. Considering performance-ranked
portfolios they found evidence of performance persistence over a one year horizon. Finally,
Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2007), using data for fund of hedge funds, show that it
is possible to identify fund of funds that deliver superior alphas. However, they ﬁnd that
new money ﬂows faster into such funds leading to a deterioration of their performance over
time.
This paper contributes to the above literature in three ways. First, control for the
measurement errors in alphas using weighted least squares and GMM procedure. The latter
deals with measurement errors and the look-ahead bias simultaneously. Second, to our
knowledge, this paper is ﬁrst to study performance persistence to account for all three major
10They also examined the standardized measure of performance, i.e., the excess return dividend by its
standard deviation.
6biases in hedge fund data, i.e. backﬁll, serial correlation, and look-ahead biases. Third, we
present evidence of hedge fund managers’ performance persistence over longer (three year)
horizons, especially among the top performing funds.
3 Econometric Methodology
In this section we describe the estimation of hedge fund performance and then we propose
a method to check for performance persistence.
3.1 Modeling the Relative Performance of a Hedge Fund
Hedge fund returns have several distinctive features. This can make the analysis of hedge
funds’ performance diﬀerent from the analysis of performance of other assets like stocks and
mutual funds.
First, hedge funds are not required to reveal their ﬁnancial information including their
returns.11 This raises a question about the selectivity of returns in hedge fund databases. We
should take into account possible reasons for a hedge fund to reveal its performance informa-
tion. One possible explanation is that some hedge funds need to raise funds. Reporting their
returns could be a way to advertise themselves. This implies that we will probably not ﬁnd
the most and the least successful hedge funds in the database. The most successful funds
most likely have enough clients without any additional promotions. The least successful
funds probably would not reveal their information to a broad set of investors.
Second, hedge fund strategies produce returns that cannot be well explained by standard
factors,12 and they also exhibit option-like features.13 The usual way to estimate the perfor-
mance in such a case is to include options on factors in addition to these factors, following
the suggestion made by Glosten and Jagannathan (1994).
Third, hedge funds often hold illiquid securities in their portfolios. Usually, it is diﬃcult
to obtain current prices for such securities. In this case, managers use past prices to estimate
the current value of assets. Therefore, we may observe serial correlation in returns. If we
completely ignore this issue, then we will get inconsistent estimates of hedge fund perfor-
mance. Scholes and Williams (1977) proposed a simple way to account for stale prices. They
11According to SEC regulation 13F institutional investors with assets under management more than $100M
are supposed to reveal their long position holdings on quarterly basis.
12See Fung and Hsieh (1997).
13See for example, Fung and Hsieh (1997), Fung and Hsieh (2001), Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), Okunev
and White (2003), Agarwal and Naik (2004), and Bondarenko (2004) for the discussion of the issues that
option-like features in managed portfolio returns create when measuring performance.
7used lags of factors along with factors in estimating the asset performance. These lags con-
trol for the serial correlation in returns. Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001) using this technique
showed that the performance of indices14 may not be as attractive as it appears from a reg-
ular regression without including any lags. Lo (2002) showed that annualized Sharpe ratios
can be signiﬁcantly overstated if the serial correlation in returns is not taken into account.
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and Okunev and White (2003) introduced models for
hedge fund returns, taking into account stale prices and return smoothing practices among
hedge funds. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) also estimated smoothing patterns for
individual hedge funds and indices.
Fourth, the history of hedge funds is relatively short. Even for long-livers the reliable
data in most cases does not exceed ten years. This creates a problem in analyzing hedge fund
risks. The hedge fund return history may simply be too short for a high risk (low probability)
event to happen. Weisman (2002) explains several simple strategies15 that can be successful
for a relatively long period of time (several years), but ﬁnally lead to bankruptcy. Those
strategies will not be correlated with systematic factors. Pastor and Stambaugh (2002b),
Pastor and Stambaugh (2002a), and Ben Dor, Jagannathan, and Meier (2003) developed
techniques for dealing with short histories. Ben Dor, Jagannathan, and Meier (2003) used
two stage regressions; Pastor and Stambaugh (2002b) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2002a)
used Bayesian analysis. Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007) applied Bayesian technique to the
hedge fund performance analysis.
Finally, the life of hedge funds can be pretty short. Hedge funds can be liquidated or
closed for new investments. Even if a database is survivorship bias free (that is, it stores all
the liquidated and closed funds), there is the issue of how these hedge funds should be taken
into account when analyzing performance persistence.
While analyzing the performance of hedge funds and performance persistence, we will
try to control for the above features of hedge fund returns. We follow Getmansky, Lo,
and Makarov (2004) in designing an appropriate model for the estimation of hedge fund
performance.
Let the true equilibrium (unobserved) excess returns follow:
Run
i,t = αi + Xtβi + εi,t (1)
where Xt is the vector of excess returns on factor portfolios (T × l), εit are i.i.d. We deﬁne
14In the case of Hedge Fund Research style indices.
15Consider for example a strategy from St. Petersburg Paradox. You place one dollar on a coin to be
tossed heads. If you lose, then you double your bets (if you do not have your own capital then you have to
borrow). If you play long enough, then with probability one you will face a borrowing constraint.
8αi as the performance of a hedge fund. We assume that the observed returns (as reported
by the hedge fund managers) are smoothed. Hence we observe the following returns
Ri,t = θi
0Run
i,t + ... + θi
sRun
i,t−s
Ri,t = αi + Xtθi
0βi + ... + Xt−sθi
sβi + ui,t
Ri,t = αi + Xtθi
0βi + ... + Xt−sθi
sβi + ui,t
Note that s may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent hedge funds. For identiﬁcation purposes we will
use the following normalization on the parameters:
θi
0 + ... + θi
s =1for any i
Combining with equation (1) we can write the observed returns as follows:
Ri,t = αi + Xtθi
0βi + ... + Xt−sθi
sβi + ui,t (2)
where
ui,t = θi
0εi,t + ... + θi
sεi,t−s (3)
As we see from (3), the error term ui,t follows an MA(s) process. The next step is to
choose appropriate factors for the model given by (2) and (3).
3.2 Relative Performance Factor Selection
In measuring relative fund performance we employed the following factors:
Variable Description
Rmkt
t Excess return on the market portfolio (CRSP )
I
J,self
t Excess return on the self-reported style index J from HFR
I
K,aux







t ].T h eﬁrst factor is the CRSP market portfolio,
and the other two factors are HFR style indices.16 Style indices are deﬁned as an equally
weighted average of returns for all hedge funds with the same strategy. The hedge funds
themselves provide information about strategies they use. The list of strategies17 deﬁned in
16Although we end up using no more than three factors, we perform a third factor selection from 32 HFR
style indices by applying a statistical model selection criterion. This helps avoid model overparametrization,
or “overﬁtting”. See Bossaerts and Hillion (1999) for a discussion about using statistical model selection
criteria in ﬁnance.
17For the oﬃcial deﬁnition of self reported index, please refer to the web page of Hedge Fund Research at
http://www.hedgefundresearch.com/pdf/HFR_Strategy_Deﬁnitions.pdf.
9the database can be found in table 1.
Style indices are good proxies for non-linear strategies of hedge funds, however there
are problems with self reported styles. For all hedge funds in the database we can ﬁnd the
styles that were reported by the hedge funds themselves. However, hedge funds may change
their styles over time, and this may not be reﬂected in the database. We observe only one
style per hedge fund and we do not know if a hedge fund has been using this style lately
or some time ago (it may depend on the willingness of a hedge fund to report any changes
in its style). To account for this “unpleasant” feature, we are going to add one more style
index18 in addition to the self reported index to try to capture changes in hedge fund styles.
This additional style index is chosen by the Schwarz’s Bayesian criterion (SBC) (details are
provided in the next subsection).
The second problem is with style indices as factors. We know that the reported hedge
fund returns are smoothed. By deﬁnition, a style index is the (equally weighted) average
of returns for all hedge funds with the same self-reported strategy. Therefore, we should
expect style indices to display serial correlations (or be “smoothed”) as well. To deal with
this problem, we consider the following model of “smoothed” indices (again we follow here















. Equation (4) is a moving average process of order l. To identify this process,
as before we assume γJ
0 + ... + γJ
l =1 . From equation (4) we see that IJ
t follow an MA(l).
Hence, the true factors ηJ
t can be estimated from (4) by maximum likelihood. For this
estimation we set l =2(i.e. we assume that indices are smoothed up to two lags19). We
will use ηJ
t as factors in (2).
The autocorrelations of orders from 1 to 12 for the original database indices IJ
t are pre-
sented in ﬁgure 1. We can see that several indices have signiﬁcant20 ﬁrst and second order
autocorrelation. The examples of such strategies are “convertible arbitrage”, “distressed
securities”, “emerging markets”, etc. These strategies involve heavy trading in illiquid secu-
rities. Figure 2 displays the autocorrelations of orders from 1 to 12 for unsmoothed indices
ηJ
t . None of the unsmoothed indices ηJ
t have statistically signiﬁcant autocorrelations, and
their autocorrelations are substantially smaller than corresponding autocorrelations in ﬁgure
18We also found little evidence that adding more than one additional style index improves the ﬁto ft h e
model.
19Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) use two lags to estimate the smooth model of hedge fund returns.
20At the a 5% signiﬁcance level.
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3.3 Estimation Procedure
I no r d e rt oc h e c kf o rp e r f o r m a n c ep e r s i s t e n c ew eh a v et oh a v ea tl e a s tt w op e r i o d sw i t h
performance estimates, see ﬁgure 3. For every period, we run the following regression based
on the model given by (2) and (3):
Ri,t = αzi + Xtδ0,i + ... + Xt−sδs,i + ui,t (5)
ui,t = θi
0εi,t + ... + θi
sεi,t−s (6)
where z is either 0 or 1, depending on if T ≤ t<T+ k or T + k ≤ t<T+2 k; Xt is the
vector of factors described in the previous subsection.
We estimate the alphas by Maximum Likelihood. We also take into account the fact that
the error term ui,t follows moving average process of order s. As a result of the maximum
likelihood estimation procedure, we obtain consistent and asymptotically eﬃcient estimators.
For every hedge fund we have to determine how many lags s to include and which
additional indices are to be used in (5). We use Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (Schwarz
(1978)) to select the best model:
SBC = −2log(L)+l × log(n)
where L is the likelihood function, l is the number of parameters and n is the number of
observations. Given a hedge fund, we estimate several models like (5) that will be diﬀerent
in the number of lags and additional style indices. We then pick a model with the highest
value of the Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion. For diﬀerent hedge funds we may have diﬀerent
number of lags21 in regression (5) and diﬀerent additional indices.22
We use primary and additional style indices as factors in estimation of hedge fund per-
formance. Therefore, we look at the relative performance of hedge funds with respect to
hedge funds that follow similar investment strategies.
3.4 Performance Estimation
Studying hedge fund performance persistence by using the performance measure relative to
HFR style indices provides valuable insight into the role of talent in the industry. Indeed, a
ﬁnding of positive performance persistence could be interpreted as evidence of a hedge fund
21We consider up to two lags for each hedge fund.
22We also consider a model without an additional style index.
11manager’s superior talent relative to his or her peers. However, such a conclusion could be
of little comfort to an investor, if it does not result in a signiﬁcantly positive performance
measured against a set of market factors.
To capture such performance measure, alpha, we modify the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model of hedge fund performance in order to account for potential smoothing
of reported returns as described in the previous subsection. Ideally, such a procedure would
require running a model given by (5) and (6), except the vector of factors, Xt,w o u l db ea s
follows:23
X0
t =[ SP500t,SizeSpr t,Bd10Yt,CredSpr t,BdOpt t,FXOpt t,ComOpt t],
where
Variable Description
SP500t S&P 500 index excess return
SizeSprt Wilshire Small Cap 1750 - Wilshire Large Cap 750 return
Bd10Y t Excess return on Fama treasury bond portfolio with maturities greater than 10 years
CredSprt Excess return on the CitiGroup Corporate BBB 10+ yr index less Bd10Yt
BdOptt Excess return on the bond trend-following factor
FXOptt Excess return on the currency trend-following factor
ComOptt Excess return on the commodity trend-following factor
Unfortunately, using all seven Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors along with their lags in (5)
would certainly result in overparametrization, since we have only 36 monthly observation
points for a three-year estimation period. Bossaerts and Hillion (1999) advocated using
statistical model selection criteria to overcome model overparametrization, or “overﬁtting”.
Hence we employ the Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion as a statistical model selection criterion
in selecting an appropriate number of factors and lags for each fund. For each fund, we
estimate models with all possible combinations of factors including up to two lags for each
factor.24 We then select a model with the highest value of the Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion.
This procedure mirrors our approach in selecting an additional HFR index factor and an
appropriate number of lags in the relative performance evaluation.
In the remainder of this paper, we refer to the resulting measure as the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) model alpha.
23Bond, currency, and commodity trend-following factors are constructed as portfolios of lookback straddle
options on these assets. These factors were introduced in Fung and Hsieh (2001) to replicate returns from
trend-following strategies in bonds, currencies, and commodities. The current data on these factors was
obtained from David Hsieh’s web site at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls.
24This results in testing 381 diﬀerent models for each fund.
123.5 Testing Hedge Fund Performance Persistence
Here we provide an econometric framework for testing a hypothesis of performance persis-
tence.
3.5.1 Simple (Naive) Regressions
Suppose we have obtained the hedge fund alphas for two periods α0i and α1i. Then we can
run a simple regression
α1i = a + bα0i + εi (7)
The persistence would mean that the slope coeﬃcient b is statistically diﬀerent from zero.
However, a statistically insigniﬁcant slope coeﬃcient would not necessarily mean the ab-
sence of persistence. That is because the slope estimate can be biased toward zero due to
measurement errors. We discuss the nature of this bias in the next subsection.
3.5.2 Measurement Errors and Estimation Bias
If the true alphas were known, then the regression (7) would have given us an unbiased
estimate of performance persistence. However, in reality there is always a measurement







1i are “true”measures of relative performance, and noise components ui, vi
are independent from the “true” alphas and from each other.











It is easy to see from (8) that the error in measuring α0 creates the downward bias in
the naive OLS estimate ˆ bOLS compared to the “true” persistence estimate ˆ b∗,s i n c e
¯ ¯ ¯ˆ bOLS


















¯ ¯ ¯ =
¯ ¯ ¯ˆ b∗
¯ ¯ ¯
Further, notice that the error in measuring α1 does not result in a biased estimate of
persistence, and thus we assume without loss of generality that α1i = α∗
1i throughout the
rest of the paper.
133.5.3 Weighted Least Squares Approach
We employ a method of weighted least squares in order to minimize the downward bias
in persistence caused by measurement errors in alphas. Performing regression (7) in terms
of the t-statistic of alpha would result in a more accurate estimate of persistence, since
more accurately measured alphas would have higher absolute t-statistic values, while less
accurately measured alphas would have lower absolute t-statistic values. Unfortunately, such
regression results could be diﬃcult to interpret as a measure of performance persistence, since
the weights would be diﬀerent across the evaluation and prediction periods.
We employ a stylized t-statistic of alpha that is obtained by dividing all alphas by their
standard deviations during the evaluation period, i.e we consider
t∗










This results in assigning more weight to more precisely measured alphas in our sample,
and it also allows us to interpret the regression result as a measure of performance persis-
tence. We further apply this approach to see whether performance persists among the best
performing or the worst performing funds by running regression (9) for the upper and the
lower terciles according to their alpha t-statistic during the evaluation period.
3.5.4 Selective Reporting Model
In this section we address the errors in variables problem and potential look-ahead bias by
modeling the nature of the dependence of the closing/liquidation decision of a fund on its
true “alpha”. We estimate the model parameters using the generalized method of moments.
While estimating alphas in the prediction period, one can notice that some hedge funds,
which were available in the evaluation period, disappeared from the database. A hedge fund
can be liquidated or closed.25 Closed funds typically stop reporting to the database, since
they do not need to attract any additional investments. In the HFR database, hedge funds
that opt out of the database may indicate the reason (liquidated fund or closed for new
investments fund). For some hedge funds this information is missing.
We build the following model. Suppose that the hedge fund performance is measured by
alphas: α0i - alpha in the evaluation period and α1i - alpha in the prediction period. We
25A hedge fund is called closed if it is closed for new investors. It continues to manage capital of its current
investors.
14can observe α0i for all funds in our sample during the evaluation period, but we can only
observe α1i for funds that were not liquidated or closed during the prediction period. We
can also observe whether a hedge fund was liquidated or closed for new investments. We
model the above pattern in hedge funds’ performance and reporting as follows:
α∗
1i = a + bα∗







liquidated, with probability p0 (α∗
0i)
α∗
1i, with probability p2 (α∗
0i)






This model implies that we observe noisy26 variables of hedge fund performance, however
the decision on hedge fund liquidation, or closing is based on the “true” α∗
0i measure of
performance.





and these random variables are independent.







One can easily establish the relationship between the variance of α∗





For notational convenience, we consider σα∗ as an unknown parameter, which is to be
estimated (instead of σu), then σu can be easily found from (10).
26The measurment error can be attributed for example to the incomplete set of factors in the performance
estimation regression.
153.5.5 GMM Estimation
















0i − μα)+c1,1 − c0},0}, if α∗
0i >μ α
Then model (M) with speciﬁcation (P) has nine parameters: a, b, c0, c1, g0, g1, σε, σα∗,a n d
μα. Of these parameters, μα is obviously identiﬁed, and it is estimated by the sample mean
of α0. The remaining eight parameters P =( a,b,c0,c 1,g 0,g 1,σε,σα∗) in model (M) with
speciﬁcation (P) are identiﬁed and can be estimated via GMM using the following moment
conditions:
1) Conditional probability of liquidation, given α0i ≤ μα:
Pr(liquidation|α0i ≤ μα)=P r ( liquidation|˜ α0i ≤ μα) (11)
2) Conditional probability of liquidation, given α0i >μ α:
Pr(liquidation|α0i >μ α)=P r ( liquidation|˜ α0i >μ α) (12)
3) Conditional probability of closure, given α0i ≤ μα:
Pr(closure|α0i ≤ μα)=P r ( closure|˜ α0i ≤ μα) (13)
4) Conditional probability of closure, given α0i >μ α:
Pr(closure|α0i >μ α)=P r ( closure|˜ α0i >μ α) (14)
5) Expected value of alpha α0 for liquidated funds::
E(α0|liquidation)=E(˜ α0i|liquidation) (15)
In the above equations (11) - (15), ˜ α0i belongs to a simulated distribution F of α0
according to the model speciﬁcation with free parameters g0, g1, c0, c1, σ2
α∗. Further denote
F∗ to be a simulated distribution of α∗
0 for observable funds that is derived from the model
speciﬁcation with parameters g0, g1, c0, c1, σ2
α∗.T h e n
166) Expected value of α1i
E (α1i|α1i is observable)=E (α∗
1i|α∗
0i ∼ F∗) (16)
= E (a + bα∗
0i + εi|α∗
0i ∼ F∗)
= a + bE (α∗
0i|α∗
0i ∼ F∗)
7) Variance of α1i
Va r(α1i|α1i is observable)=Va r(a + bα∗
0i + εi|α∗
0i|α∗
0i ∼ F∗) (17)
= σ2
ε + b2Va r(α∗
0i|α∗
0i ∼ F∗)
8) Covariance between α1i and α0i
cov (α1i,α 0i|α1i is observable) (18)
= cov (a + bα∗






Notice that estimates for parameters g0, g1, c0, c1, σα∗ c a nb eo b t a i n e db ys o l v i n gt h e
system of equations (11), (12), (13), (14), (15). The estimate for the slope b can be found from
(18), the intercept a estimate can be computed from (16), and the variance σ2
ε estimate can
be obtained from (17). This proves that the above eight moment conditions (11) - (18) specify
the exactly identiﬁed case for estimating the set of parameters P =( a,b,g0,g 1,c 0,c 1,σε,σα∗).
We estimate the parameters and standard errors via the two step GMM procedure described
in Hansen (1982) and Hansen and Singleton (1982) by numerically solving27 the system of
equations (11) - (18) for numerically simulated distributions F and F∗.
3.5.6 Monte Carlo Simulation
As a robustness check of the above GMM procedure, we used the Monte Carlo approach
where we simulated 100 independent data sets. Each of these data sets has 493 observations28
that were simulated with parameter values representative of our GMM estimates in section
4. The results are provided in table 2.
We observe a close match between the simulated parameter values and their average
GMM estimates, which indicates an eﬀective GMM procedure. We also observe a close
27We wold like to thank Ken Judd and Che-Lin Su for suggesting SNOPT software that we used in our
algorithm.
28This replicates the size of the smallest cross-section in our study.
17match in GMM-implied and observed standard deviations of estimates of a, b,a n dσε.
This indicates that the GMM inferences about statistical signiﬁcance of the performance
persistence coeﬃcient, b,a r ee ﬃcient. It may be worth noting that while we observe some
discrepancy between GMM-implied and observed standard deviations of estimates of g0, g1,
c0, c1,a n dσα∗, these are mostly auxiliary parameters in our selective reporting model.
3.5.7 Biases in Simple vs. GMM Models












In order to compare ˆ bOLS and ˆ bGMM estimators we have to account for the two types of
estimation bias:
1) Measurement bias: Va r(α0i) >Va r(α∗
0i),




The combined eﬀect of the above biases is that Va r(α0i) >Va r(α∗
0i|α∗
0i ∼ F∗),w h i c h
results in ¯ ¯ ¯ˆ bOLS
¯ ¯ ¯ <
¯ ¯ ¯ˆ bGMM
¯ ¯ ¯.
This means that the naive regression OLS slope estimate (19) is biased toward zero
compared to the GMM slope estimate (20).
4 Estimation Results
In this section we present the data and the results of the estimation of all the models proposed
in the last section.
4.1 Data Description
The data for this research was generously provided by Hedge Fund Research. The database
contains the history of monthly hedge fund returns beginning in 1990.29 However, the
29For some funds, history dates back to the 1980s.
18information about when a fund actually joined the database is only available since May
1996. Hence, we consider the time period from May 1996 until April 2005. We consider only
hedge funds with dollar returns (both oﬀshore and onshore), which report their returns as
net of all fees. The yearly summary statistics is presented in table 3.
When a hedge fund joins the HFR database, it is given an option to select one strategy
from the HFR list. These strategies are used in computation of monthly self reported style
indices.30 The indices are computed as returns on equally weighted portfolios of all funds
using the same strategy.
4.2 Estimation of Hedge Fund Alphas
In order to evaluate performance persistence over three-year periods, we only consider hedge
funds that had at least three years of observations. This leaves us with 1755 hedge funds.
As described in the econometrics methodology section, in order to test for the persistence
in hedge fund returns, we ﬁr s te s t i m a t ea l p h a sα0i in the evaluation period, then estimate
alphas α1i in the prediction period for the same hedge funds (if available) and proceed with
a cross-section of hedge fund alphas (future and past alphas) which is tested for persistence.
We form four overlapping cross-sections with three year evaluation and prediction periods
using the nine years of available backﬁll bias free data. Table 4 shows the timeline for the
estimation of alphas.
For each of the four resulting cross-sections, we compute relative performance alphas as
well as the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model alphas. Comparing adjusted R-squares from the
two models (provided in tables 5 and 6), we observe that the average mean adjusted R-square
of the relative performance model is 68% higher, compared to the mean adjusted R-square
of the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. Consistent with our conjecture in the introduction, we
conclude that the relative performance model estimates individual fund performance more
precisely compared to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model.
Following our conjecture that the relative performance could be more indicative of valu-
able managerial talent, we investigate relative alpha performance persistence in the remain-
der of this section. However, in section 5, we employ the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model
alpha in order to demonstrate tangible beneﬁt to an investor from our relative performance
persistence analysis.
We show in section 5 that portfolios of winners selected on their relative performance
exhibit a higher degree of out-of-sample Fung and Hsieh (2004) performance persistence,
30Only hedge funds with dollar returns reported on monthly basis, net of all fees are used in the computation
of self reported indices. These indices are also free of the backﬁll bias, since backﬁll observations are excluded
from index calculations.
19as compared to portfolios selected on their Fung and Hsieh (2004) performance alphas.
This conﬁrms our conjecture, and validates our focus on the relative performance alphas in
studying performance persistence.
We further eliminated outliers in the evaluation period by truncating the top and bottom
1% of the data. We did not do the same for the prediction period, since these outliers are
not known ex-ante in the evaluation period, and thus cannot be used for out-of-sample
predictions.
4.3 Performance Persistence
4.3.1 Simple (Naive) Regression
The ﬁrst approach to check for persistence is to run the naive regression (7):
α1i = a + bα0i + εi.
The results of the naive regression are presented in table 7 and the scatter plots are pre-
sented in ﬁgure 4.31 The slope coeﬃcient b is signiﬁcant in three out of four cross-sections,32
and the average estimate of performance persistence across all cross-sections is 21.5%. How-
ever, the persistence estimate, b,s u ﬀers from the downward bias due to measurement errors,
and it also does not account for the fact that some hedge funds disappeared from the data-
base due to various reasons. We address these biases in subsections that follow. Moreover,
our naive regression results are not very robust with respect to outliers in α1 in the predic-
tion period.33 This further underscores the importance of weighted least squares and GMM
approaches to measuring performance persistence.
4.3.2 Weighted Least Squares Regression
Here we employ a method of weighted least squares in order to minimize the downward bias
in persistence caused by measurement errors in alphas. We estimate the regression (9), i.e.
t∗










31A few outliers in α1 are oﬀ the scale of the plots.
32At the 5% signiﬁcance level.
33Naive regression results after truncating the top and bottom 1% of the data with respect to α1 are
presented in table 8.
20The results of the weighted least squares regression are presented in table 9, and the
scatter plots are presented in ﬁgure 5. The slope coeﬃcient b is statistically signiﬁcant34 in
three out of four cross-sections, and the average estimate of performance persistence across
all cross-sections is 28.4%. While we did not eliminate outliers in the prediction period, they
may obscure the out-of-sample persistence interpretations in this instance.35 Weighted least
squares regression results after truncating the top and bottom 1% of the data with respect to
t∗
α1i indicate a statistically signiﬁcant36 performance coeﬃcient, b, across all cross-sections.37
However, the magnitude of the persistence estimate, b, is noticeably smaller in the third cross-
section. That cross-section has the closest breaking point to the worst overall performance
year for the hedge fund industry over the study period.38 This suggests that superior skill
that is reﬂected in our measure of relative performance persistence may not be as valuable
to an investor during periods of adverse economic conditions for the hedge fund industry as
a whole. We conjecture that when there are fewer opportunities in the economy for hedge
fund managers as a group, there will be less cross-sectional dispersion in managers’ alphas,
i.e., the performance diﬀerential between the more talented and the less talented managers
is likely to be less pronounced. We leave modeling this dependence of relative performance
on market conditions to future research.
Notice that an investor can only beneﬁt from our approach by investing in hedge funds
run by talented managers, and staying away from the ones that have not demonstrated
persistent skill. Hence it may be of little value to an investor to ﬁnd evidence of negative
performance persistence, since an investor cannot take a short position in a hedge fund. On
the other hand, evidence of positive performance persistence could be potentially valuable,
since taking long positions in hedge funds run by talented managers could result in achieving
superior returns. It is important to point out that although relative positive performance
persistence could be interpreted as evidence of managerial talent, it does guarantee future
superior performance as measured by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. We investigate
the relationship between past relative performance and future performance in section 5, and
conclude that superior relative performance is idicative of superior future performance as
measured by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model.
We study whether positive or negative performance persists by running regression (9)
separately for funds in the upper and the lower terciles according to their alpha t-statistic
34At the 1% signiﬁcance level.
35For example, a few large outliers may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence regression results, while having a modest
impact if considered as a part of a larger portfolio. Our analysis in section 5 conﬁrms this observation.
36At the 10% signiﬁcance level.
37See table 10.
38Measured by the HFR total index.
21during the evaluation period. For robustness, we also perform this analysis after eliminating
outliers in the prediction period. Remarkably, we ﬁnd evidence of performance persistence
among top hedge funds, while we ﬁnd no evidence of persistence among bottom funds.
These results are presented in tables 11 and 12. This is consistent with the interpretation
of superior performance persistence as a result of superior managerial talent, which is also
reﬂected in superior prior performance. Our ﬁndings also support the view that managers
of superior skills restrict inﬂow of new money in order to maintain their performance.
4.3.3 GMM Estimation
During the prediction period, a hedge fund can either remain or drop out from the database.
Funds may disappear from the database due to liquidation, closing, or stop reporting for
unknown reasons. Summary statistics of hedge funds according to this decomposition are
presented in tables 13 and 14. If probabilities of liquidation and closure are inﬂuenced by
fund’s “true” prior performance, α∗
0, it will result in biased persistence estimates, which
is also known as a look-ahead bias. Considering histograms of distributions of liquidated
and closed funds by deciles of α0 (ﬁgure 6) and conditional probabilities of liquidation and
closure conditional on α0 being in top and bottom parts of its distribution (table 15), we
conclude that there is a relationship between fund’s prior performance and probabilities of
fund’s liquidation and closure. We model this relationship by specifying diﬀerent patterns of
liquidation and closure for the top and bottom parts of the true alpha distribution through
model (M) with speciﬁcation (P). This approach allows us take into account measurement
errors along with the look-ahead bias, and it is estimated via the GMM procedure. Estimates
from the GMM procedure are provided tables 16 and 17. The estimates of the persistence
coeﬃcient b are roughly consistent with the weighted least squares estimates from subsection
4.3.2, and the average GMM estimate of performance persistence across all cross-sections
is 30.7% compared to the weighted least squares average of 28.4%. GMM estimated con-
ditional probabilities of liquidation and closure (ﬁgure 7) are also consistent with observed
probabilities in table 15 and ﬁgure 6.
Notice that in the ﬁrst two cross-sections liquidated funds tend to have low alphas, while
closed funds tend to have high alphas (see table 13). This is consistent with our statistical
model (M) and the speciﬁcation (P), but it is the only consequence of the model. In fact,
the speciﬁcation (P) is ﬂexible to allow decreasing probabilities of closure with increasing
α0, as demonstrated by negative g1 parameter estimates in third and fourth cross-sections.
These estimates are consistent with descriptive statistics in the last two cross-sections, as
closed funds do not outperform liquidated and observable funds (see table 14).
22However, it is worth pointing out that the underlying fundamentals of the decision to
close a fund to new investors might have changed after 2001. In order to test this conjecture
we performed probit tests of the decision to liquidate vs. close among the funds that were
either closed or liquidated in our data. The estimates of the probability of liquidation are
provided in table 18. The results indicate the signiﬁcance of α0 in liquidation vs. closure
decisions vanishes in the last two cross-sections, while the ratio of last ﬂo w st oa s s e t sg a i n si n
signiﬁcance in the last two cross-sections. This supports our conjecture that the role of the
relative performance measure, α0, in the decision to liquidate or close a fund has diminished
since 2001.
4.3.4 Non-Reporting Funds
The non-reporting funds39 comprise on average 15.6% of the data among all cross-sections.
Can we use these funds in our further performance analysis? The answer to this question lies
in the distribution of observable characteristics of the non-reporting funds during the evalu-
ation period. We may attempt to classify the non-reporting funds as closed or liquidated on
the basis of their evaluation period performance α0. Such classiﬁcation would be consistent
with assumptions of the model (M) and the speciﬁcation (P), but only if the distribution
of the relative performance measure α0 for non-reporting funds resembles the distributions
of α0 for funds that stopped reporting, but indicated a reason for doing so (i.e. liquidated
and closed funds). Unfortunately, Kolmorogov-Smirnov test for distribution closeness does
not indicate consistently close ﬁt between the distribution of non-reporting funds and the
distribution of liquidated and closed funds. In fact, the best match between the distribution
of non-reporting funds and the distribution of liquidated and closed funds only come from
the fourth cross-sections, while in the other three cross-sections the non-reporting funds
distribution is closest to the distribution of all reporting funds.40
Hence we conclude that classifying non-reporting funds as either closed or liquidated
would result in model (M) misspeciﬁcation, and that treating non-reporting funds as missing
data would be the most consistent approach.
4.3.5 Potential Biases
Here we consider a possibility of a scenario when funds with large positive alphas during
the ﬁrst three year period perform poorly during the second three year period and liquidate,
and funds with large negative alphas during the ﬁrst three year period perform extremely
39The non-reporting funds are those that dropped out of the HFR dataset without reporting a reason.
40See table 19 for Kolmorogov-Smirnov test results.
23well during the second three year period and close. Such a pattern could contribute to
ﬁndings positive measured persistence in alphas of funds that survived during both three
year periods.
However, as seen in ﬁgure 6 and tables 13, 14, and 15 funds with lower performance
during the ﬁrst period were more likely to be liquidated. This indicates that the scenario of
performance reversal for liquidated funds between the two periods is unlikely.
In case of closed funds, ﬁgure 6 along with tables 13 and 15 indicate that in the ﬁrst two
cross-sections funds with higher prior performance were more likely to be closed. This does
not suggest performance reversal in the ﬁrst two cross-sections. On the other hand, in the
last two cross-sections (see ﬁgure 6 and tables 14 and 15) closed funds with lower ﬁrst period
p e r f o r m a n c ew e r em o r el i k e l yt ob ec l o s e d ,w h ich could be an indication of performance
reversal among a subset of underperforming funds in the ﬁrst period. If that was the case,
we would have been more likely to ﬁnd an indication of stronger performance persistence
among the lower performing hedge funds. Nevertheless, our weighted least squares analysis
produced no evidence of performance persistence among the lower performing hedge funds,
hence we conclude that it is unlikely that there could be a performance reversal pattern
strong enough to signiﬁcantly bias our previous ﬁndings of performance persistence.
While the above observations allow us to suggest that our ﬁnding of performance per-
sistence is not a spurious phenomenon, a completely deﬁnitive answer on the matter could
only be obtained by completely eliminating the bias caused by funds dropping out of the
database by tracking down the performance of all the funds that dropped out without being
completely liquidated.
5C a n I n v e s t o r s B e n e ﬁt?
While we provide evidence of the relative performance persistence in the previous section, it
is not obvious that an investor can achieve tangible superior performance, alpha, by using this
knowledge. We construct portfolios of hedge funds based on their past relative performance
in the evaluation period, and then track their absolute performance41 during the prediction
period. All the hedge funds are sorted by their evaluation period relative alpha t-statistic,
tα0i. We compose an inferior portfolio of all hedge funds in the bottom of the ranking, a
superior portfolio of all funds in the top, and a neutral portfolio of all the remaining funds.
For robustness, we used 33% and 10% cutoﬀs for the superior and inferior portfolios. We
then invest one dollar to every portfolio in the beginning of the prediction period. One dollar
41Here we deﬁne absolute performance as the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model alpha.
24is equally split among all the hedge funds in a given portfolio. If a fund disappears during
the prediction period, the money is reinvested among the surviving funds in a portfolio.42
The portfolio approach allows us to reduce performance measurement errors, and increase
the accuracy of the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. It also allows to take into account
performance of funds that disappeared from the sample during the prediction period, as
they remain in their portfolios up to the time of their disappearance from the database.
We calculate each out-of-sample portfolio performance during the prediction period and
in-sample past performance during the evaluation period as Fung and Hsieh (2004) model
alphas. We also consider appraisal ratios43 to capture the robustness of managerial perfor-
mance. The performance of the three portfolios in the evaluation and prediction periods
are in tables 20 and 21. Notice that the relative performance measure is used for ranking
purposed only.
As we see from tables 20 and 21, the superior portfolio provides consistent signiﬁcantly
positive44 out-of-sample alphas, while inferior and neutral portfolios fail to provide a con-
sistent statistically signiﬁcant out-of-sample performance. Moreover, the superior portfolio
consistently dominates other portfolios in appraisal ratios, indicating a robust out-of-sample
persistence of superior performance.45
5 . 1 W h yU s eP a s tR e l a t i v eA l p h at oP r e d i c tF u t u r eA l p h a ?
Earlier we assumed that past relative alpha would be a better predictor of future alpha than
past alpha itself. In this section we verify the veracity of that assumption. Tables 22 and 23
provide out-of-sample future alphas of inferiror, neutral, and superior performers identiﬁed
using historical alphas estimated using the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model.
We again observe that the superior portfolio provides signiﬁcantly positive46 out-of-
sample alphas, while inferior and neutral portfolios fail to provide a consistent statistically
signiﬁcant out-of-sample performance.
Since both predictions based on the relative alpha and the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model
provide evidence of superior out-of-sample performance, we compare the eﬀectiveness of
42We also consider a pessimistic scenario, under the assumption that the money invested into disappeared
hedge funds cannot be recovered at all, regardless of the reason the hedge fund disappeared.
43Based on Fung and Hsieh (2004) model.
44With the exception of the second cross-section for the 33% cutoﬀ.
45In the pessimistic scenario, the superior portfolio consistently provides higher out-of-sample alphas com-
pared to inferior and neutral portfolios. The average out-of-sample alpha for the superior portfolio of the top
33% of funds was -0.4774, while the average alpha for the bottom 33% of funds was -1.0206. The average
out-of-sample alpha for the superior portfolio of the top 10% of funds was -0.4743, while the average alpha
for the bottom 10% of funds was -2.3378. However, these results are heavily inﬂuenced by the attrition rates
in the portfolios.
46With the exception of the second cross-section for both 33% and 10% cutoﬀs.
25their predictions for superior portfolios, i.e. for portfolios of previous winners picked by
diﬀerent performance measures.47 Consistent with our conjecture, we observe that port-
folios of winners selected on their relative alphas exhibit a higher degree of out-of-sample
absolute performance persistence as compared to portfolios selected on their Fung and Hsieh
(2004) model alphas. Portfolios with superior past relative alphas outperformed portfolios
with superior past Fung and Hsieh (2004) model alphas by delivering higher average alphas
and appraisal ratios.48 Moreover, on average, portfolios with superior past relative alphas
retained a higher percentage of their past alphas during the out-of-sample period compared
to portfolios with superior past Fung and Hsieh (2004) model alphas. This further validates
our use of the relative performance model in our previous performance persistence analysis.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Hedge fund managers are given much more ﬂexibility regarding where and how to invest
compared to mutual fund managers. The growth of hedge funds, with 1.9 trillion dollars
invested in assets by 2007, may well reﬂect the need for giving talented managers who know
where superior opportunities exist at a given point in time the necessary ﬂexibility to exploit
that talent. A natural question that arises is whether it is possible to identify those hedge
fund managers who are able to exploit the ﬂexibility given to them better than others.
While the ﬂexibility given to hedge fund managers may help in generating superior
returns, it also makes performance evaluation more diﬃcult. Hedge fund returns are unlike
returns from standard asset classes, and exhibit option-like features that have to be taken
into account when evaluating performance. Further, since hedge funds invest in illiquid
assets, care has to be exercised in measuring their systematic risk. In this paper we develop
a method for evaluating the performance of a hedge fund manager relative to a suitably
constructed peer group. Our method takes into account option-like features in hedge fund
strategies and serial correlation in hedge fund returns caused possibly by investments in
illiquid assets. We also take into account the backﬁll bias in our data set and the look-ahead
bias (i.e. the fact that a hedge fund may be liquidated or closed and exit the data set).
We employ a method of weighted least squares in order to minimize the downward bias in
persistence caused by measurement errors in alphas.
We ﬁnd evidence of persistence in the performance of funds relative to their style bench-
47We cannot use the pessimistic scenario for comparing the eﬀectiveness of the relative alpha and the Fung
and Hsieh (2004) model alpha predictions, since out-of-sample pessimistic estimates are heavily inﬂuenced by
portfolio attrition rates. Notice that portfolios formed on the basis of relative alphas have diﬀerent attrition
rates compared to portfolios formed on the basis of Fung and Hsieh (2004) model alphas.
48See table 24 for details.
26marks. It appears that on average more than 25% of the abnormal performance during a
three year interval will spill over into the following three year interval. We provider further
support for the interpretation of performance persistence as evidence of superior managerial
talent by ﬁnding strong evidence of performance persistence among top hedge funds, while
ﬁnding little evidence of persistence among bottom funds. Our ﬁndings of performance
persistence are also consistent with the evidence of out-of-sample superior performance of
portfolios of past winners.
Our analysis highlights diﬃculties that arise in predicting how a hedge fund manager will
perform in the future relative to his peer group. While the assumptions we had to make in
order to answer the question of performance persistence among hedge fund managers appear
reasonable, we need a better understanding of what happened to funds that vanished from
publicly available databases to provide a quantitative answer to that question with utmost
conﬁdence. We hope that our ﬁndings will stimulate research examining how funds that
discontinue reporting their performance do subsequently.
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30# HFR Strategy Style Index # HFR Strategy Style Index
1 Convertible Arbitrage 17 Fund of Funds: Conservative
2 Distressed Securities 18 Fund of Funds: Diversiﬁed
3 Emerging Markets: Asia 19 Fund of Funds: Market Defensive
4 Emerging Markets: E. Europe/CIS 20 Fund of Funds: Strategic
5 Emerging Markets: Global 21 Macro
6 Emerging Markets: Latin America 22 Market Timing
7 Equity Hedge 23 Merger Arbitrage
8 Equity Market Neutral 24 Regulation D
9 Equity Non-Hedge 25 Relative Value Arbitrage
10 Event-Driven 26 Sector: Energy
11 Fixed Income: Arbitrage 27 Sector: Financial
12 Fixed Income: Convertible Bonds 28 Sector: Health Care/Biotechnology
13 Fixed Income: Diversiﬁed 29 Sector: Miscellaneous
14 Fixed Income: High Yield 30 Sector: Real Estate
15 Fixed Income: Mortgage-Backed 31 Sector: Technology
16 Fund of Funds (Total) 32 Short Selling
Table 1: Style indices in Hedge Fund Research database.
a b g0 g1 c0 c1 σε σα∗
Simulated values -0.07 0.30 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.03 1.00 0.80
Observed means -0.0576 0.2971 0.0893 0.0864 0.0801 0.0265 1.0004 0.8175
GMM-implied std dev 0.0422 0.0700 0.4050 0.3870 0.0716 0.1147 0.0301 2.0384
Observed std dev 0.0469 0.1008 0.0230 0.0372 0.0206 0.0330 0.0368 0.0962
Table 2: Summary statistics from the Monte Carlo GMM simulation. The results are based
on 100 independent data sets of 493 simulated observations. The table presents the
simulated values of selective reporting model parameters, the mean estimates of these
parameters from 100 observed GMM estimates, the mean standard deviation of the
estimates as implied by the GMM procedure, and the observed standard deviations of 100
parameter estimates.
31year total entered left attrition mean return median return std. dev.
1996 1123 1123 91 8.10% 0.57% 0.61% 5.10%
1997 1326 294 163 12.29% 1.14% 0.86% 5.31%
1998 1436 273 206 14.35% -0.19% 0.23% 7.98%
1999 1479 249 199 13.46% 1.50% 0.67% 7.97%
2000 1546 266 251 16.24% -0.40% 0.12% 7.12%
2001 1851 556 204 11.02% 0.12% 0.24% 4.64%
2002 2183 536 277 12.69% -0.09% 0.13% 4.34%
2003 2744 838 281 10.24% 1.11% 0.76% 3.31%
2004 3274 811 364 11.12% 0.23% 0.20% 2.86%
Table 3: Yearly distribution of hedge funds. The table presents the total number of funds
that reported during a year, the number of funds that entered and left the database, and
mean, median, and standard deviation of monthly excess returns. A year represents the
time period from May of that year until April of the next year.
Evaluation Period Prediction Period
Cross-section Begins Ends Begins Ends
1 May 1996 April 1999 May 1999 April 2002
2 May 1997 April 2000 May 2000 April 2003
3 May 1998 April 2001 May 2001 April 2004
4 May 1999 April 2002 May 2002 April 2005
Table 4: Timeline for evaluation and prediction periods.
Evaluation period adjusted R2 Prediction period adjusted R2
Cross-section mean median std.dev. mean median std.dev.
1 0.49 0.52 0.26 0.45 0.46 0.28
2 0.50 0.55 0.26 0.44 0.45 0.27
3 0.50 0.52 0.25 0.47 0.51 0.27
4 0.44 0.45 0.28 0.53 0.58 0.26
Table 5: Summary statistics of relative performance model adjusted R-squares.
Evaluation period adjusted R2 Prediction period adjusted R2
Cross-section mean median std.dev. mean median std.dev.
1 0.33 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.26
2 0.30 0.30 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.26
3 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.31 0.30 0.28
4 0.21 0.18 0.25 0.35 0.34 0.26
Table 6: Summary statistics of Fung and Hsieh (2004) model adjusted R-squares.
321996-1999 - 1999-2002 1997-2000 - 2000-2003
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value
a -0.1462 -1.17 0.2445 -0.0493 -0.41 0.6822
b 0.3795 3.15 0.0018 0.2899 2.40 0.0168
1998-2001 - 2001-2004 1999-2002 - 2002-2005
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value
a -0.1457 -1.64 0.1016 -0.2693 -5.02 <.0001
b 0.0564 0.69 0.4910 0.1341 2.97 0.0031
Table 7: Naive regression results. Persistence is captured by the slope coeﬃcient, b,w h i c h
is statistically signiﬁcant in two out of four cross-sections.
1996-1999 - 1999-2002 1997-2000 - 2000-2003
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value
a -0.0683 -1.01 0.3111 -0.0953 -1.64 0.1016
b 0.1130 1.73 0.0855 -0.0108 -0.18 0.8549
1998-2001 - 2001-2004 1999-2002 - 2002-2005
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value
a -0.1967 -4.55 <.0001 -0.2297 -7.65 <.0001
b 0.0344 0.86 0.3883 0.1513 5.99 <.0001
Table 8: Naive regression results without ouliers in a1. Persistence is captured by the slope
coeﬃcient, b, which is statistically signiﬁcant in two out of four cross-sections.
1996-1999 - 1999-2002 1997-2000 - 2000-2003
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value
a 0.1291 0.63 0.5308 -0.2929 -1.42 0.1569
b 0.5267 4.48 <.0001 0.3532 2.90 0.0040
1998-2001 - 2001-2004 1999-2002 - 2002-2005
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value
a -0.2622 -0.94 0.3456 -0.7273 -5.91 <.0001
b 0.0435 0.26 0.7921 0.2120 3.28 0.0011
Table 9: Weighted least squares regression results. Persistence is captured by the slope
coeﬃcient, b, which is statistically signiﬁcant in all cross-sections.
331996-1999 - 1999-2002 1997-2000 - 2000-2003
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value
a 0.1653 1.04 0.2978 -0.0620 -0.53 0.5993
b 0.3878 4.25 <.0001 0.1882 2.65 0.0033
1998-2001 - 2001-2004 1999-2002 - 2002-2005
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value
a -0.4146 -4.74 <.0001 -0.5871 -6.47 <.0001
b 0.1043 1.91 0.0568 0.1990 4.16 <.0001
Table 10: Weighted least squares regression results without ouliers in t∗
a1i. Persistence is
captured by the slope coeﬃcient, b, which is statistically signiﬁcant in all cross-sections.
Top 33% Bottom 33%
Cross-section Parameter Estimate t-stat p-value Estimate t-stat p-value
1996-1999 - 1999-2002 b 1.3188 4.36 <.0001 0.4336 0.72 0.4728
1997-2000 - 2000-2003 b 1.0517 4.58 <.0001 0.3804 1.01 0.3161
1998-2001 - 2001-2004 b -0.4285 -0.79 0.4314 -0.1801 -0.72 0.4748
1999-2002 - 2002-2005 b 0.2719 2.25 0.0253 0.0421 0.16 0.8749
Table 11: Weighted least squares regression results. Persistence is estimated separately for
the top and the bottom of the tα0 ranking.
Top 33% Bottom 33%
Cross-section Parameter Estimate t-stat p-value Estimate t-stat p-value
1996-1999 - 1999-2002 b 1.2689 6.03 <.0001 -0.1714 -0.41 0.6794
1997-2000 - 2000-2003 b 0.9463 4.62 <.0001 0.0458 0.18 0.8581
1998-2001 - 2001-2004 b 0.2427 1.78 0.0770 -0.0659 -0.30 0.7634
1999-2002 - 2002-2005 b 0.2284 2.23 0.0270 -0.1446 -0.66 0.5104
Table 12: Weighted least squares regression results without ouliers in t∗
a1i. Persistence is
estimated separately for the top and the bottom of the tα0 ranking.
341996-1999 - 1999-2002 Observable Liquidated Closed Non-Reporting Total
number of hedge funds 313 64 25 91 493
percent 63.49% 12.98% 5.07% 18.46% 100%
α0 mean -0.0832 -0.1037 0.0916 -0.2097 -0.1003
α0 median 0.0306 -0.2378 0.1515 0.0181 0.0228
α0 std. dev. 1.0378 1.3317 1.1029 1.4083 1.1561
assets ($M) mean 239.43 38.27 58.52 92.97 176.84
assets ($M) median 56.54 7.72 31.25 21.34 39.63
assets ($M) std. dev. 658.17 96.52 71.04 178.18 536.61
1997-2000 - 2000-2003 Observable Liquidated Closed Non-Reporting Total
number of hedge funds 456 75 32 110 673
percent 67.76% 11.14% 4.75% 16.34% 100%
α0 mean 0.0934 -0.3380 0.2286 -0.0901 0.0217
α0 median 0.1641 -0.1788 0.4533 0.0426 0.1045
α0 std. dev. 1.0002 1.3642 1.5400 1.1464 1.1076
assets ($M) mean 225.50 32.77 55.46 71.00 170.17
assets ($M) median 54.91 7.76 10.50 18.40 37.32
assets ($M) std. dev. 621.75 88.10 94.06 142.28 521.25
Table 13: Distribution of hedge funds in the prediction period from the ﬁrst and second
cross-sections. Alphas are measured as monthly percentage returns.
1998-2001 - 2001-2004 Observable Liquidated Closed Non-Reporting Total
number of hedge funds 508 82 37 96 723
percent 70.26% 11.34% 5.12% 13.28% 100%
α0 mean 0.0610 -0.4090 -0.2909 -0.1686 -0.0408
α0 median 0.1336 -0.1301 0.0032 0.0032 0.0828
α0 std. dev. 1.0843 1.2830 1.3552 1.4191 1.1811
assets ($M) mean 301.91 58.43 59.24 77.28 231.37
assets ($M) median 69.00 9.98 11.18 17.76 44.95
assets ($M) std. dev. 722.15 265.56 105.38 155.68 623.05
1999-2002 - 2002-2005 Observable Liquidated Closed Non-Reporting Total
number of hedge funds 519 103 31 109 762
percent 68.11% 13.52% 4.07% 14.30% 100%
α0 mean 0.1100 -0.1676 -0.6037 -0.0580 0.0194
α0 median 0.1753 0.0575 -0.0681 -0.0445 0.1033
α0 std. dev. 1.1848 1.2578 1.5462 1.1137 1.2103
assets ($M) mean 326.26 33.11 51.59 180.11 255.30
assets ($M) median 79.60 9.98 10.10 10.30 41.00
assets ($M) std. dev. 685.47 100.57 100.45 926.32 675.97
Table 14: Distribution of hedge funds in the prediction period from the third and fourth
cross-sections. Alphas are measured as monthly percentage returns.
35Cross-section Pr(L|α0 ≤ μα0) Pr(L|α0 >μ α0) Pr(C|α0 ≤ μα0) Pr(C|α0 >μ α0)
1996-1999 - 1999-2002 0.2143 0.1197 0.0476 0.0726
1997-2000 - 2000-2003 0.1807 0.0955 0.0361 0.0732
1998-2001 - 2001-2004 0.1860 0.0921 0.0698 0.0515
1999-2002 - 2002-2005 0.1714 0.1475 0.0607 0.0375
Table 15: Observed probabilities of liquidation and closure conditional on observed values
of α0.
1996-1999 - 1999-2002 1997-2000 - 2000-2003
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value
a -0.1687 -1.7528 0.0796 -0.0528 -0.5971 0.5504
b 0.4956 2.4465 0.0144 0.4032 1.5714 0.1161
g0 0.1268 1.2236 0.2211 0.1384 0.6050 0.5452
g1 0.0322 3.0140 0.0026 0.0768 0.5363 0.5918
c0 0.1479 10.3059 <.0001 0.0886 1.8474 0.0647
c1 0.0595 6.8046 <.0001 0.0289 0.9718 0.3312
σε 2.1965 7.0974 <.0001 2.5665 4.1042 <.0001
σα∗ 0.9486 3.0592 0.0022 0.8908 1.0842 0.2783
Table 16: Results of the GMM procedure for the ﬁrst two cross-sections.
1998-2001 - 2001-2004 1999-2002 - 2002-2005
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value
a -0.1465 -2.0607 0.0393 -0.2721 -6.2971 <.0001
b 0.0577 1.3860 0.1657 0.2707 4.1214 <.0001
g0 0.1106 0.6351 0.5254 0.0459 1.1248 0.2607
g1 -0.0112 -1.3048 0.1920 -0.0388 -2.3711 0.0177
c0 0.1091 2.2626 0.0237 0.1060 6,7898 <.0001
c1 0.0750 8.8217 <.0001 0.0697 11.5243 <.0001
σε 1.9976 3.7028 0.0002 1.2051 7.7121 <.0001
σα∗ 1.1071 1.3256 0.1850 0.8361 1.6502 0.0989
Table 17: Results of the GMM procedure for the last two cross-sections.
361996-1999 - 1999-2002 1997-2000 - 2000-2003
Parameter Estimate ChiSq Pr>ChiSq Estimate ChiSq Pr>ChiSq
Intercept 0.5131 10.31 0.0013 0.4085 8.14 0.0043
α0 -0.1175 0.81 0.3683 -0.1790 3.54 0.0600
last_returns -0.1097 4.64 0.0313 -0.0865 3.75 0.0527
last_flows_to_assets -0.0136 0.15 0.6962 -0.0264 0.44 0.5070
1998-2001 - 2001-2004 1999-2002 - 2002-2005
Parameter Estimate ChiSq Pr>ChiSq Estimate ChiSq Pr>ChiSq
Intercept 0.3584 6.17 0.0130 0.6233 17.99 <.0001
α0 -0.0640 0.42 0.5181 0.0625 0.39 0.5330
last_returns 0.00084 0.03 0.8673 0.0398 0.34 0.5621
last_flows_to_assets -0.1801 2.68 0.1016 -0.4549 5.23 0.0222
Table 18: Probit estimates of the probability of liquidation. α0 is estimated over the
evaluation period. last returns is the cumulative fund’s return over the last year of a
fund’s presence in the database. last flows to assets is a ratio of cumulative cash ﬂows
over a fund’s last assets over the last year of a fund’s presence in the database.
1996-1999 - 1999-2002 1997-2000 - 2000-2003
Distributions KSa statistic p-value KSa statistic p-value
Observable funds 0.8829 0.4168 0.9650 0.3094
Liquidated and closed funds 0.8837 0.4156 1.0105 0.2589
All reporting funds 0.7041 0.7045 0.9187 0.3674
1998-2001 - 2001-2004 1999-2002 - 2002-2005
Distributions KSa statistic p-value KSa statistic p-value
Observable funds 1.0974 0.1797 1.4868 0.0240
Liquidated and closed funds 1.3483 0.0527 0.8328 0.4918
All reporting funds 0.8909 0.4055 1.3373 0.0559
Table 19: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for closeness of alpha 0 distributions. KSa statistic
denotes the asymptotic Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, and the p-value is provided for the
test of the null hypothesis that there is no diﬀerence between the two distributions. The
non-reporting funds distribution is compared to the observable funds distribution,
liquidated and closed funds distribution, and to the all reporting funds (i.e. observable,




























































































Table 20: Out-of-sample performance of three relative performance ranked portfolios.
Portfolios are formed and ranked according to the previous relative t-alpha performance in
the evaluation period with the 33 percent cutoﬀ. Then the Fung and Hsieh (2004) portfolio
alphas and appraisal ratios are calculated for the prediction (i.e. out-of-sample) period, as
well as past alphas for the evaluation period (i.e. in-sample alphas). Portfolio alphas




























































































Table 21: Out-of-sample performance of three relative performance ranked portfolios.
Portfolios are formed and ranked according to the previous relative t-alpha performance in
the evaluation period with the 10 percent cutoﬀ. Then the Fung and Hsieh (2004) portfolio
alphas and appraisal ratios are calculated for the prediction (i.e. out-of-sample) period, as
well as past alphas for the evaluation period (i.e. in-sample alphas). Portfolio alphas




























































































Table 22: Out-of-sample performance of three absolute performance ranked portfolios.
Portfolios are formed and ranked according to the previous Fung and Hsieh (2004) t-alpha
performance in the evaluation period with the 33 percent cutoﬀ.Then the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) portfolio alphas and appraisal ratios are calculated for the prediction (i.e.
out-of-sample) period, as well as past alphas for the evaluation period (i.e. in-sample
alphas). Portfolio alphas marked with ***, **, and * are statistically signiﬁcant at 1, 5,




























































































Table 23: Out-of-sample performance of three absolute performance ranked portfolios.
Portfolios are formed and ranked according to the previous Fung and Hsieh (2004) t-alpha
performance in the evaluation period with the 10 percent cutoﬀ. Then the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) portfolio alphas and appraisal ratios are calculated for the prediction (i.e.
out-of-sample) period, as well as past alphas for the evaluation period (i.e. in-sample
alphas). Portfolio alphas marked with ***, **, and * are statistically signiﬁcant at 1, 5,
and 10 percent respectively.































Table 24: Average estimates of out-of-sample performance for the superior portfolio.
Standard deviations are provided in parentheses. Retained alpha is measured as average
percentage of the past alpha retained in the out-of-sample period.
40Figure 1: The autocorrelation functions for style indices are presented in this ﬁgure. The
style indices used are before the adjustment for smoothing (i.e. as they were presented in
the original database). The autocorrelations were computed for lags from 1 to 12. The thin
horizontal lines around the horizontal axes represent 95% conﬁdence intervals. Style index
names can be retrived from table 1. For example, index #1 stands for Convertible
Arbitrage index.
41Figure 2: The autocorrelation functions for style indices are presented in this ﬁgure. The
style indices used are after the adjustment for smoothing (ηJ
t from (4)). The
autocorrelations were computed for lags from 1 to 12. The thin horizontal lines around the
horizontal axes represent 95% conﬁdence intervals. Style index names can be retrived from
table 1. For example, index #1 stands for Convertible Arbitrage index.
42 
           Evaluation Period   i 0 α              Prediction Period   i 1 α  
T T+k  T+2k
Figure 3: This diagram shows the timeline for the estimation of hedge fund alphas. In this
paper k is equal to 36 months, i.e. evaluation and prediction periods are 3 years. The
hypotheses is tested if alphas from the evaluation period can explain alphas from the
prediction period.


































































Figure 4: Scatter plots from the naive regression.





























































































































































































































Figure 7: GMM estimated conditional probabilities of liquidation and closure with respect
to α∗
0.
46